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THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
THINKING ABOUT FUNDAMENTALS
HALS. SCOTT AND PHILIP

A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSAC-

Westbury, New York: The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1995, 2nd ed. xix+ 1097 pp.

TIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATIONS.

Reviewed by Merritt B. Fox*

The huge increase in cross border capital flows over the last two
decades has profoundly important implications for society in general and
the law in particular. These flows give rise to a set of legal problems
that are sufficiently distinct and coherent to constitute a legal field of
their own. Confirming this observation is the development of a specialized legal practice whose members spend the bulk of their time working
on such transactions. Nevertheless, a law school course in international
finance is a rarity, even at the schools that train most of the students
who ultimately join this practice.
The arrival of the first casebook in the area is thus a signal event,
particularly so because of its high quality. International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation is bound to encourage the offering of
courses in the area and influence ~heir content. In doing so, the book is
likely to affect how lawyers practice and hence the development of the
law itself. Its publication thus invites an attempt to identify the fundamental features of international finance as a subject of legal inquiry.
Understanding the legal environment in which cross border capital
flows occur requires three types of knowledge. The first, and main focus
of the Scott and Wellons book, concerns the institutions of international
finance: its organizations, practices, products, and regulatory backdrop.
The second concerns the political economy of cross border capital
flows: why do they take place, what impediments prevent an even
greater volume, why do they take their different forms, what are their
overall welfare effects, and who is helped and who is hurt by them? The
third concerns the rules that directly structure the behavior of parties to
these transactions and determine their obligations, rights, and remedies.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Ph.D. (Economics), Yale
University (1980); J.D., Yale University (1971); B.A., Yale University (1968). Financial
support for this research was provided by the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law
School.
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THE INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

A reader of this book, unless already deeply engaged in the business
of international finance, is certain to become far more sophisticated
about its institutions. The authors cover an impressive array of topics
using clear, remarkably up-to-date materials, most of which are easily
accessible to readers without a technical background.
The authors start with the offering and trading of foreign securities
within the United States. Readers are exposed to the different markets
existing in the United States and their regulatory frameworks. In addition to the public markets, the authors describe the Rule 144A market,
in which securities of foreign issuers may, without registration, be
offered and sold to qualified institutional buyers. They also introduce
the workings of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), whereby a U.S.
investor can hold a security which represents a share of a foreign issuer
but which is publicly traded in the United States, transferable in the U.S.
on the books of a U.S. bank, and pays dividends in U.S. dollars.
A number of other topics involving securities are covered as well.
The authors describe the structure and regulation of European and
Japanese securities markets and the growing importance of competition
among the securities markets of the world. Included in this description is
a provocative discussion of the possible structural causes of the Japanese
stock market crash in the early 1990s and their relation to the country's
continuing economic problems. There are careful treatments, both at a
national and transnational level, of clearance and settlement mechanisms
and of capital adequacy requirements for securities firms. In each case,
the discussion is accompanied by a consideration of how the matter
affects the risks of transnational securities transactions. The authors also
provide descriptions of the markets and regulatory environments for
several other kinds of transnationally tradable assets, including
Eurobonds, global bonds, the securities of asset securitizations, the
securities of privatizing enterprises in emerging market countries, and
options and futures. The privatizing enterprises discussion is neatly built
on a case study of the privatization of Mexico's Telemex and includes a
discussion of the December 1994 peso crisis. The options and futures
discussion includes a brief analysis of the Barings collapse and its
regulatory lessons.
The book contains extensive materials on exchange ':'ate systems,
foreign exchange markets, and the attempt to create a single European
currency. There is a particularly good discussion on the costs and benefits of a single currency and of its large political ramifications. The
currency exchange materials are presented early in the book, thereby
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permitting the later discussions of Eurodollar loans, derivatives and
swaps to assume a basic understanding of the relationships among
inflation rates, exchange rates, and interest rates.
Finally, the book contains materials on international banking and on
payments systems. The authors describe the U.S., European, and Japanese banking systems, with a special emphasis on the regulation of
foreign banks and the overseas operations of domestic banks. The
Japanese discussion includes an interesting consideration of regulatory
reforms in response to the country's early 1990s financial crisis and the
continuing "bad loan" problem. There is an intelligent analysis of the
problems in judging a bank's capital adequacy in relation to the risks of
its loan portfolio and the contributions of the Basle Accord in establishing minimum regulatory standards in this area. The extensive discussion
of payments systems - the process by which value is transferred from
one party to another through transfers of claims on banks - would help
even experienced practitioners better understand this arcane but important element of risk in many international transactions.

II.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CROSS BORDER CAPITAL FLOWS

Scott and Wellons do not attempt to lay down, in any kind of
explicit fashion, a theoretical foundation concerning the phenomenon
under study. Bits and pieces are provided along the way through the
book, but it is worth considering briefly what a more comprehensive
treatment would look like and its potential rewards.
According to neoclassical economic theory, cross border capital
flows occur for two reasons. The first concerns differences between
nations in their amounts of domestically generated savings relative to
the real investment opportunities available within their borders. Imagine
this in the context of a world with two countries, A, a country with
more savings relative to its domestic real investment opportunities and
B, a country with less savings relative to its domestic opportunities. In
the absence of cross border capital flows, these differences will mean
that the marginal real investment project in A will have a lower expected rate of return than that of the marginal real investment project in B.
If cross border capital flows are possible, persons with savings in A will
have incentives to invest them, directly or indirectly, in projects in B.
More projects will be implemented in B and fewer projects will be
implemented in A. Global economic welfare will be enhanced since the
projects that would otherwise have been implemented in A have a lower
expected return than the ones the flows permit to be implemented in B.
Who is hurt and who is helped? Notwithstanding the global gain,
the transfer is harmful to labor in A since a smaller capital stock will
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reduce labor's marginal productivity and hence wages (a point made
salient by Patrick Buchanan in this year's presidential campaign). 1 For
parallel reasons, it will be harmful to savers in B. The gainers are savers
in A and labor in B. In each country, the gains of the gainers exceed the
losses of losers since each country is taking advantage of the difference
between its domestic ratio of wages to return on capital and the ratio of
wages to return on capital abroad by, in essence, importing the factor
that is relatively cheaper abroad.
The · second reason for ·cross border capital flows sugge.sted by
neoclassical theory is that they permit welfare enhancing reallocations of
risk. The most important aspect of this is the potential it creates for
greater investor diversification. An investor who takes advantage of this
potential significantly reduces the amount of risk she incurs in connection with a portfolio having any given expected rate of return. She can
thereby improve the tradeoff she faces between risk and return. This
happens because the addition of foreign investments to the set of opportunities in which she can invest results in the opportunities having less
in common with each other than before. This reduces the "systematic"
component of the risk associated with each available opportunity. The
remainder - each opportunity's "unsystematic" risk component - can
be diversified away. So the investor can construct a portfolio with the
same expected return as before, but with less risk.
This risk allocation reason for cross border capital flows has some
interesting implications. For instance, it suggests that the flows will go
both ways. This is important politically because it will lead different
countries to have more similar perspectives: each will have investors
that are hostage to the policies of the others. Also, for the flows leaving
countries with a relative abundance of savings to ones with a relative
shortage of savings, a smaller portion will be iri the form of direct
investment, and a larger portion will be in the form of more easily
diversified publicly traded securities sold to portfolio investors.
The risk-allocation reason for cross border investing also presents a
puzzle: why isn't there more of it? U.S. investors, including professionally managed institutional ones, are still far less diversified internationally than finance theory suggests they ought to be. 2 As a result, they

I. The world, of course, is more complicated than this simple model. For reasons
discussed below, there are capital flows going in both directions. The reaction abroad to U.S.
policies that reduce capital outflows would probably result in reduced capital inflows as well.
If the reduction in inflows were sufficiently great, labor would actually be worse off than if
the policies reducing outflows had not been initiated.
2. Investors' "home market bias," the tendency to underdiversify internationally, has
received considerable attention by academics and practitioners. See, e.g., Ian Cooper & Evi
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appear to be enduring either substantially less returns or substantially
more risk than they could be. The explanation may in part involve a
sense on the part of most investors that they are likely to do better
investing in issuers about which they have more information despite the
admonitions of efficient market hypothesis adherents to the coiltrary. 3
This sense may or may not be an accurate perception of reality today,
but in either case it will decline with increasingly global diffusion of
information. Other impediments to transnational investing - the cost
and difficulty of effecting transactions in foreign markets 4 and the risks
associated with inadequate securities firm capital requirements, clearance
and settlement systems, and uncoverable exchange rate exposure - are
likely to decline over time as well. For example, Scott_ and Wellons
describe in detail current national and multinational efforts to diminish
these risks. 5

Kaplanis, Home Bias in Equity Portfolios, Inflation Hedging, and International Capital
Market Equilibrium, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 45 (1994); Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba,
Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets, 81 AMER. EcoN. REV. 222 (1991).
Cooper and Kaplanis develop a model that suggests empirically that a representative
U.S. investor who is risk averse at a conventionally estimated level pays dearly for the home
country bias in the composition of her portfolio, receiving an annual rate of return in the
range of 2% to 6% less than a portfolio of the same risk level but without the bias. Cooper &
Kaplanis, supra, at 55-57.
3. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that an investor is not at any disadv!ll)tage
trading in a security for which he does not know publicly available information relating to its
value because such information is already reflected in the price at which he buys or sells.
This would suggest that the fact that he knows less about foreign issuers than about domestic
ones should not deter him from trading in foreign issuer securities and that for any given
number of stocks, the way to achieve the portfolio with the best risk/return tradeoff is to
choose randomly from among all the world's issuers.
The absence of anything approaching this kind of international diversification is explained in part by the fact that many investors, whether they should, choose their portfolios
on the basis of their own beliefs, not randomly. Those beliefs in turn are based on specialized
information not possessed by all participants in the market. Such investors are likely to
believe that they will do better by concentrating their buying and selling in equities of issuers
about which they and their advisers start with natural information advantages. The futures of
most issuers are determined more by forces within the borders of their own nation than by
forces occurring outside. As I have developed in more detail elsewhere, residents of a given
nation have advantages over foreigners in gaining specialized information about events
occurring inside their nations. Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market:
Who Should Regulate Whom, 10-11 (University of Michigan Law & Economics Working
Paper Series No. 12, 1996) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
Other commentators share the view that home bias is primarily explained by the local
nature of much of the information to which people have access. Martin S. Feldstein, Domestic
Saving and International Capital Movements in the Lang Run and the Shari Run, 21 EUR.
EcoN. REV. 129, 148 (1983); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a
Two-Country World, 10 J. MONETARY EcoN. 335, 357 (1982).
4. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 869-81 (1995).
5. Id. at 264-90, 391-427, 836-54.
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Neoclassical theory assumes a world in which investment opportunities in each country are a given, there is no money, and all resources
including labor are fully employed. Powerful insights emerge from the
resulting model, but relaxing one or more of these assumptions can
suggest additional reasons why cross border capital flows occur, as well
as why national governments sometimes want to limit them. For example, a country's investment opportunities are not necessarily a given. In
some cases, they may exist only if some needed element is provided
from abroad. This might be managerial expertise, technology, marketing
channels, brand recognition, or other parts of .what is most efficiently
structured as an integrated enterprise. In such a situation, depending on
the particular patterns of information asymmetries and moral hazard
problems, the needed foreign element may not be available unless
accompanied by capital from the same source. If so, there must be a
cross border capital flow, this time in the form of direct investment,
whereby a corporation in one country establishes facilities in another.
This reason, too, will lead to two-way flows, for example, U.S. auto
companies establishing operations in Europe and European auto companies establishing operations here. The introduction of money and multiple currencies into the model suggests yet another reason, related to the
interplay of interest rates and expectations concerning future exchange
rates, why investors would want to engage in cross border capital transfers. It also suggests why government officials might want to limit these
flows in furtherance of their monetary or exchange rate goals even when
such regulations might inhibit the cross border flows motivated by
welfare-enhancing investor desires to reallocate risk or capital for real
investment. The introduction of possible labor unemployment into the
model can, in a country politically unable to use macroeconomic tools
to stimulate its economy, undermine neoclassical theory's conclusion
that capital outflows to higher return projects abroad produce a net gain
to the residents of the capital exporting country.
Knowledge of this larger context in which the institutions of international finance operate is helpful in a number of ways to lawyers, investment bankers, commercial bankers, corporate executives, government
officials, and scholars. First, this knowledge makes work in international
finance more professionally satisfying because it illuminates the positive
social functions served by many of the transactions with which such
persons are likely to be involved. On a more practical level, the same
kind of calculus helps identify potentially value creating transactions ones that leave both parties better off - the impediments to which can
be overcome by imaginative, new kinds of structuring. An example
would be a packaging plan for a previously unsecuritized asset that
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would generate a combined cash flow with sufficiently predictable
characteristics to permit their securitization and the offering of the
resulting securities internationally. By providing a new opportunity for
greater diversification, this scheme will lower the cost of financing the
assets involved - say, home mortgages - and improve investor welfare at the same time. For an advocate, the calculus provides a source of
effective arguments in cases where it shows a public gain from a legal
or other governmental decision desired by a client. For judges and
legislative and administrative officials, it provides a basis for evaluating
arguments that advocates put forward. For the counselor, the calculus
helps predict the reactions of governmental agents to a client's proposed
actions.
Knowledge of this larger context also helps persons in all of these
roles identify trends and calculate who will be helped by them and who
will be hurt. One example concerns the large gains that can still be
obtained from further international diversification and the probable rapid
decline in the impediments that have prevented greater diversification so
far. 6 These factors suggest that we will see a massive increase in cross
border portfolio investment in the next decade or so. 7 One result is
likely to be a great increase in transnational competition among securities exchanges. To the extent that countries determine whether to impose
their disclosure rules on issuers based on whether the issuers' securities
are offered or traded within their borders, this increased competition will
create political pressures that might well lead to a disclosure rule raceto-the-bottom. 8 Another result is the likelihood that most major corporations, whatever their nationality, will, through transnational portfolio
investment, eventually become majority foreign owned. This has interesting corporate governance implications. For any given corporation,
shareholder expectations concerning what constitutes good management

6. See Fox, supra note 3, at 9-22.
7. U.S. investors currently hold approximately $7 trillion of the total world capitalization
of $17 trillion. James L. Cochrane et al., Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down
the Barriers Separating Supply and Demand I (New York Stock Exchange Working Paper
No. 95-04, 1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law). Some commentators
predict that U.S. investors will double the foreign component of their equity portfolios from
5% to around 10% within the next few years; this translates into $350 billion moving into
foreign equities. Id.
8. Fox, supra note 3, at 115-28. Addressing a somewhat analogous issue within our
domestic federal system of corporate and securities law-making, Lucian Bebchuk has argued
that placing the regulation of corporate disclosure under the authority of state corporate law
rather than federal securities law would result in a suboptimally low level of disclosure.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490-91 (1992).
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are likely to change. 9 Also, the shift in ownership pattern is likely to
enliven transnational competition in corporate chartering. 10
Another example of how this knowledge can help predict trends
concerns the mix of methods used to channel capital to promising
projects in developing countries. Traditionally, much of this was in the
form of direct investment by North American and European. corporations. Developing countries, however, found it increasingly offensive
that decisions having important impacts on their economies wei;-e being
made from abroad. 11 With the glut of petrodollars starting in mid-1970s,
an alternative form of capital transfer was developed, the syndicated
Eurodollar loan. It was popular with developing countries in part because it appeared not to have the foreign control problems associated
with direct investment. What should have been apparent at the time
became obvious with hindsight: funding promising projects in developing countries with long term loans having rates that float corresponding
with changes in short term money markets involves an extraordinarily
inefficient allocation of risk. The developing country, the party least
able to diversify away risk and withstand what is left, ended up with the
riskiest position: a levered claim on the project's residual cash flow. The
problem was aggravated by a tendency in the next decade for interest
rates to be inversely correlated with .that cash flow. Adding insult to
injury, the control gains turned out to be illusory since most borrowers
became unable to meet their obligations. The resulting workouts gave
foreigners, such as International Monetary Fund officials, considerable
power over local economic policy.
The obvious alternative is to fund promising developing country
projects through transnational equity sales to portf9lio investors. This

9. As more investors from country A begin to invest in country B companies, the
investors from country A - who have had most of their prior experience with a corporate
law regime different from B's - will carry their expectations with them and affect the
investor relations climate for firms in country B.
IO. As a corporation's shareholdings become less dominated by shareholders from its
home country, there may be greater acceptance of a change to a foreign country of incorporation. Whether competition in corporate chartering among states within the United States is
good or bad has been the subject of considerable debate. See Bebchuk, supra note 8; William
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, .The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Pu'zz.le, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 225
(1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
11. See, e.g.• ANDREAS F. LoWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT 81-185
(1982) (detailing the history of foreign private investment in Chile's copper industry since the
early 1900s); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, 455-66 (1994)
(describing Mexican expropriations of foreign owned agrarian and oil properties between
1915 and 1940).
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form of cross border capital flow combines direct investment's superior
risk allocation with Eurodollar }ending's supposed freedom from foreign
control .. While the early 1990s speculative enthusiasm among U.S.
investors for emerging market equities has dampened somewhat, impediments to this sort of investment should decline. We can reasonably
expect over time the development of credible corporate governance
structures for the issuers of this equity, fair and efficient markets for
these equities to trade in, and more effective national disclosure regimes. 12 With these developments, there should he a large growth in
capital raised in this fashion.

III.

RULES DIRECTLY STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE TRANSACTIONS.

The third kind of knowledge needed to understand the legal environment in which cross border capital flows occur concerns the rules that
directly structure the behavior of parties to these capital flows and
determine their obligations, rights, and remedies under any given set of
terms. Again, Scott and Wellons give this ·relatively little attention.
Indicatively, while there is a large number of questions scattered through
the book asking students to give advice to policymakers, there are
comparatively few questions asking students to give advice to persons
actually· engaged_ in cross border transactions.
·
The distinctive feature about the rules that govern the behavior of
parties to cross border financial transactions is the absence of a single,
unitary legal system. Consider three examples of the kinds of problems
that arise as a result. The first example involves a German firm offering
a new issue of its stock. The offering is handled by some German
investment banks who are only contacting investors residing in Europe.
During a trip to New York, however, the chief executive makes some
enthusiastic statements about the firm's future to a room full of reporters
from the world's business press. The statements make their way into the
Wall Street Journal and, predictably, a certain number of Americans
place orders with brokers in Germany for the firm's shares. Should the
issue be registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 providing

12. A number of institutional changes, assisted by experts from the developed capitalist
countries, are underway in emerging market countries. See, e.g., Robert Rice, Business and
the Law: Ciearing the Way for Capital - A Look at a Model Law to Provide the Basis for
Workable Secured Lending Regimes in Eastern Europe, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at 20;
Emily Barker, Starting from Scratch, AM. LAW., June 1994, at 42 (describing efforts of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to draft laws dealing with security issues
in Eastern Europe).
·
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for disclosure in connection with public offerings? If the answer is yes,
would this result have been avoided if the chief executive had restrained
himself and not made the statement until he was in front of a similar
gathering after his return to Germany even though the same Wall Street
Journal article would have likely resulted? Suppose that the 1933 Act
registration is not necessary but after a year of secondary trading on the
Frankfurt exchange and on the "pink sheets" in the United States, 3000
U.S. investors own 52% of the firm's outstanding shares. Is the firm
now required to start complying with the periodic disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 despite the fact that it
has not engaged in any focused attempt to acquire U.S. investors? If it
is, what are the consequences of failing to comply? These questions involve issues of jurisdiction to prescribe under international law as well
as United States policy on extraterritorial application of its securities
laws. They are too new to have generated significant case law, but
analogies are available from the United States approaches to the question of statutory reach in the areas of criminal law, choice of law,
antitrust law, and the antifraud provisions of securities law .13 Facility in
dealing with these kinds of questions is important for an understanding
of the legal environment of international finance since such questions
come up in connection with a range of securities and banking activities.
The second example involves an Eastern European enterprise whose
shareholders, after privatization, are mostly Western European and North
American investors. The enterprise accumulates significant assets abroad
in the form of bank accounts, inventory, and sales facilities. A backlash
election in its home country puts in power a new communist government that seizes the enterprise's assets in return for some subordinated
bonds of questionable value. What are the rights of the Western shareholders? If their rights have been violated, where can they get a judgment? If they get one, how do they enforce it? Have any rights of the
United States been violated? If so, are there any remedies available that
could help the investors and how likely is it that the United States
government will pursue them? These questions involve issues of the
obligation to protect alien property and sovereign immunity under
international law, treaty interpretation, the United States act of state
doctrine relating to judicial deference to executive authority, and the
U.S. law of federal jurisdiction. The possibility that such a scenario
could in fact occur makes the answers important inputs in calculating

13. See generally STEINER ET AL., supra note 11, at 820-994 (describing the transnational reach of national legal systems).
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the risks of investing in shares of newly privatized companies in developing and former communist countries.
The third example involves a Eurodollar loan to a similar enterprise
in another Eastern European country. The loan is guaranteed by the
government. The enterprise's product is the country's principal export
and the market for it becomes severely depressed. The enterprise defaults and the government, citing a severe shortage of hard currency
reserves, declares a moratorium on honoring its guarantee. Again, the
enterprise has significant assets abroad. The same questions arise as in
the second example, with the lenders substituting for the shareholders.
The possibility that this scenario could take place again makes the
answ~rs important for calculating the risks of making the loan in the
first place. Also, at the outset of such a transaction, lawyers representing
the various parties would want to know how the terms of the documentation would affect the rights and remedies available to the lenders. The
same bodies of law applicable to the question in the second example are
implicated here. Assuming that. properly drafted documentation does
increase a lender's rights and remedies, there is also the question of
whether that documentation will really improve the lender's position if
the scenario does eventuate, given that the matter almost certainly will
ultimately be resolved by negotiation, not litigation. The experience of
lenders with differing documentation in the Eurodollar loan workouts in
the 1980s would be relevant here.
CONCLUSION

A law, business, or public policy student entering the field of international finance will have a substantial advantage if she takes a course
using the Scott and Wellons book. As a teacher in the area, I was delighted at its publication and intend to assign it to my own students.
Most practitioners already working in the field will also find it useful
reading since few of them know the range of institutional detail provided by these materials.
The book is insufficiently comprehensive, however, to become the
kind of classic that defines a field. Nor, with this limited focus, lack of
bibliography, and lack of index, is it likely to become a standard reference work. Nevertheless, it is more than just another casebook. Its clear
and concise materials illuminate the often mysterious and arcane .details
of the institutions of international finance and will open up a world
about which many, absent its publication, would have remained ignorant. A future edition with a broadened focus would make the book that
much more influential.

